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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how deviations between expected and actual art auction
results impact the auction guarantees made within an artist’s market and among multiple artists,
and whether those impacts can be identified and quantified. To do so, I use a theoretical pricing
model based on datasets of historical auction records going back to the earliest available date for
a specific artist but no further than 2010. I find that, in comparing the model’s expected and actual
results to empirical price deviations at auction, we can identify and quantify the impact of those
deviations on guarantees.
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1. Introduction
In 1973 taxi tycoon Robert Scull sold 50 works at auction by some of the most important
abstract expressionist and pop artists of the time. The most controversial aspect of the now
legendary sale, A Selection of Fifty Works from the Collection of Robert C Scull, was the amount
of money he was seen profiting off the artists’ work – a relatively new concept in the
contemporary art world at the time. What goes less noticed, but was equally novel about the sale,
was the inclusion of a guaranteed minimum price from Sotheby’s at the time (Goldman, “Bob
and Spike collect…” section, para. 1). Since then, this auction house tool has greatly evolved in
both scale and complexity. The primary question that I seek to answer in this paper is whether, in
today’s art market, guarantors are efficiently pricing the risk associated with guarantees for
artwork sold at auction.
I will answer this question by first analyzing how the deviation between pre-sale
expectations and actual results within a particular artist’s secondary market auction prices affects
the risk/reward profile of the guarantees and/or third-party irrevocable bids made for that artist’s
work. I will then take this a step further by demonstrating that the difference in risk/reward
profile for the guarantees made on behalf of different artists can be identified and distinguished
amongst one another. In doing so, I hope to provide a framework through which we can try and
identify artist markets where the risk associated with guarantees for those artist’s work is either
undervalued, overvalued, or correctly valued.
Using both new and traditional frameworks from the fields of culture and economics, I
will put forward quantitative tools that can help us gain a measurable and more transparent
understanding of the pricing mechanics underpinning auction house guarantees and third-party
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irrevocable bids. If proven useful, auction houses, third-party bidders and sellers can utilize this
model to more effectively deploy guarantees towards minimizing the potential risk and
maximizing the potential reward associated with buying and selling artwork at auction.
Regardless, it is my hope that, in the process of doing so, I will bring further understanding and
transparency to a practice that is conceived by many art market participants as generally opaque
and high risk in nature.
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2. Overview of Guarantee Market
2.1 Auction House Guarantees
Guarantees were first introduced in the early 1970s when 47 Kandinskys and other works
from the Guggenheim Museum were sold by Sotheby’s with a guaranteed minimum (Adam and
Burns, 2011). Since then, the guarantee market has gone through ebbs and flows alongside
broader economic conditions. When an auction house agrees to guarantee a work of art sold at
auction, they are agreeing to guarantee the consignor, or seller, a minimum amount regardless of
whether or not the work achieves that guarantee price at auction. If the work does not meet that
minimum threshold at auction, then it is the auction house’s obligation to make good on the
guarantee by either paying the difference or even purchasing the work outright in the case that
the work fails to sell all together. In exchange for taking on this risk, the auction house will
charge a fee, or insurance premium, in the form of a share of upside cashflows, or overage, if the
work inevitably sells above the pre-determined guarantee amount. Predominantly used as a
business getting tool, the auction house is effectively selling an insurance policy to the consignor
that will pay off in the case that the work underperforms at auction. Because each guarantee
negotiation is bespoke, the guarantee price and overage share will vary depending on the seller’s
and auction house’s needs and risk appetite.
The types of sellers who seek out guarantees can come from any of the pools of potential
consigners who auction houses traditionally work with. Typically, those consignors are private
collectors, estates or art dealers whose approaches to seeking guaranteeing for the work they sell
will depend on their specific needs. In the case of private collectors, the decision to seek a
guarantee may be driven by their certainty, or lack thereof, that the artwork will achieve a certain
price when sold at auction. The private collector’s willingness to accept certain terms from the
3

auction house can be driven by why they are selling the work in the first place. If the seller is, for
whatever reasons, in great financial need of the capital, they may be willing to accept less
favorable terms than a seller who is not driven by financial need.
Although different, these motivations are not so unsimilar from that of estates and art
dealers. It is not uncommon for the executive of an estate to find themselves in a position where
a significant portion of the estate’s assets are tied to a collection of artworks and, in the interest
of best settling the estate’s affairs, the certainty of an auction house guarantee can be very
attractive to the executive and the estate’s beneficiaries if they decide to sell a part or all of the
collection. The guarantee arrangement becomes even more attractive to the estate’s beneficiaries
when considering the size and timing of estate taxes that will be owed to the IRS. Lastly, dealers,
who tend to be asset rich and cash poor, may seek an auction house guarantee when selling
objects at auction for a myriad of reasons. On the other end of the negotiating table is the auction
house.
The three major auction houses (Sotheby’s, Christie’s and Phillips) are unsurprisingly the
primary guarantors in the secondary art market. Having both the requiem financial means and
network of potential bidders puts those three auction houses in the best position to take on the
risks involved with guarantees. Nevertheless, each auction house’s desire to guarantee specific
works and price the guarantees accordingly will depend on a number of factors. The first being
the specific auction house’s guarantee strategy as seen by the average value of works they
guarantee – in 2019, Christie’s average guarantee price was approximately $7 million versus
$3.1 million and $1.8 million at Sotheby’s and Phillips, respectively (ArtTactic Auction
Guarantee Report – December 2019). Further, the auction houses’ confidence in achieving the
guarantee level that the consignor is willing to accept, and the standing risk position that the
4

auction house finds themselves in at any given point in time, will greatly affect their ability to
offer guarantees. For example, if Christie’s has already guaranteed a $25 million painting by
Pablo Picasso, they may not deem it appropriate to guarantee an additional multi-million dollar
work by the same artist. If they do so, they may require more attractive pricing terms than
Sotheby’s and Phillips would assuming the latter two have not also guaranteed a major Picasso
painting for an upcoming sale. If the auction house nevertheless decides the consignment is
worth guaranteeing in order to secure the consignment for auction, but does not wish to hold the
risk in-house, they may seek to transfer all or part of that risk in the form of an irrevocable bid
from a third-party buyer.
2.2 Third-Party Irrevocable Bids
In its modern form, the first known third-party guarantee, or irrevocable bid, was
believed to have been made in 1999 for a painting by Pablo Picasso that had been guaranteed by
Sotheby’s (The Economist, 2011). However, a similar type of deal may have been struck earlier
when, in 1986, avid collector Peter Brant agreed to pay $5 million for a majority stake in the
second major sale of Robert Scull’s famous art collection before it ultimately achieved a total of
$8.6 million at Sotheby’s (Kinsella, 2019). Similar to the auction house guarantee, an irrevocable
bid essentially represents an advanced commitment from a third-party to bid on the work at
auction at some pre-determined price level regardless of whether or not the inevitable bidding for
that work exceeds the third-party’s irrevocable bid. In exchange for taking on the guarantee risk,
the third-party will be compensated by the auction house in the form of some claim to the
auction house’s share in upside cash flow. Additionally, the third-party may negotiate additional
compensation in the form of some fixed financing fee which would be paid out of the auction
house’s buyer’s premium charged to the ultimate winner of the auction sale.
5

The use of third-party irrevocable bids has increased substantially over the years as the
auction houses have become more risk-averse to holding large amounts of in-house guarantee
liability on their books following a great deal of losses incurred during the Global Financial
Crisis. In 2007, just under 40% of all lots included in New York and London’s Impressionist and
Contemporary Sales were backed by a guarantee – all of which were held in-house. Between
2009 and 2010, guarantees all but disappeared from auctions, but have since come back into the
spotlight. In 2017, just over 40% of all lots in those same sales were backed by a guarantee – the
vast majority of which were held by a third-party backer (Pi-Ex, 2018). As irrevocable bids have
become more popular, the number of third-party bidders seeking to leverage the guarantees as a
tool for whatever purposes has also grown. Auction houses saw the number of third-party
guarantors grow from just a dozen in 2014 to over 90 in 2019 (Crow, 2019). They come from
many different backgrounds, and have varying degrees of art market knowledge, but typically
include private collectors who may want to add the work to their collection, dealers who may
have a significant investment stake in the guaranteed artist’s market, and, of late, an increasing
number of investors who may see the guarantees as potentially lucrative financial opportunities.
Regardless of their motives, the use of guarantees by auction houses and irrevocable
bidders has come under tremendous scrutiny from the art world media and those competing
against them at auction. However, that perception certainly depends on who you ask and which
articles you read. In the November 2019 article “Auction Guarantees Lifted the Art Market to
Record-Breaking Heights. The Only Problem? The Golden Age of Guarantees Is Over,” Artnet
reporter Eileen Kinsella writes about how the dip in guarantee levels between 2017 and 2019
points to a reduced demand for the product being driven by an unsustainable number of novices
entering the third-party guarantor field, potential disincentive to competition from non-
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guarantors, and lower overall financial benefits. On the other hand, in his July 2018 article “Why
Guarantees Are Actually Good For The Art Market,” art advisor and former President of the
Americas for Christie’s Doug Woodham points to the heightened level of certainty and liquidity
that guarantees provide as beneficial to consignors and the secondary art market on the whole.
What I believe everyone can agree upon is that a greater understanding of the financial
machinations behind guarantee pricing can increase transparency and make the tool more
effective for all parties involved.
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3. The Impact of Deviations Between Expected And Actual Auction Prices On Guarantees
3.1 Current Guarantee Pricing Methodology
The current method by which an auction house determines guarantee pricing can be a bit
of an art in of itself and is ultimately shaped by the negotiating process between auction house
and consignor. After speaking with Charles Bent, a former business manager at Sotheby’s, I was
able to piece together a basic picture of this process. Primarily using a scenario based approach
to determine the likelihood around potential outcomes for the work’s performance at auction, the
auction house can discern how sensitive the profitability of the guarantee is to those outcomes.
Typically denoted as the bear, base and bull cases (financial euphemisms for downside, average
and upside outcomes), the scenarios may be allocated certain probabilities or weights depending
on the auction house specialists’ level of confidence around a lot’s final price achieved at sale. If,
for example, an auction house is confident in their scenario analysis and have a assigned a good
probability to a work selling at a certain price, then they may be willing to guarantee the work at
that price. Depending on the auction house’s relative level of confidence, there are two main
pricing levers they can pull to adjust for these variations in risk.
The first lever that the auction house can pull is the guaranteed price itself – raising it in
the case of a high degree of confidence or lowering it in the case of a low degree of confidence.
The guarantee price will of course vary from case to case but is, on average, assumed to preside
somewhere around 90% of the pre-sale low estimate for that work. The second is the share in
overage that the auction house charges the consignor in return for taking on this risk – charging a
lower level of overage in the case of a high degree of confidence or charging a higher level of
overage in the case of a lower degree of confidence. The auction house’s claim to overage
typically falls around 25% (+/- 5%) but can vary greatly based on the circumstances. If the
8

auction house decides to bring on a third-party irrevocable bid, they will typically seek a bid that
is at or slightly above the auction house guarantee price. In exchange, the auction house will
offer a claim to their share in overage as well as a potential fixed financing fee to be paid out of
the auction house’s commissions earned on the sale.
Depending on the consignor’s objectives and circumstances, the consignor may ask for a
guarantee upfront or they may be approached by the auction house with an offer to guarantee the
consignment. Nevertheless, as Bent highlighted in our conversation, it is more often the case
than not that the lower and upper estimates placed on a guaranteed work of art are set after a
guarantee price has been agreed to. This sequence of events is counter-intuitive to what you
might expect, but it does make sense when the auction house is not the party actively seeking out
opportunities to guarantee works of art but rather the consignors. If guarantee prices are
negotiated prior to estimates being set you may expect the auction house to be incentivized to
keep estimates as low as possible to entice bidding, thus creating a bias around estimates for
guaranteed works. However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest an effect on price from
the guarantee itself once the value of the item is taken into account (Graddy and Hamilton,
2019).
3.2 Options Contracts
Financial professionals are quick to compare the structure of guarantees made for artwork
to that of stock options, and they are not wrong to do so. Financial options originally grew out of
futures exchanges whereby producers of physical commodities such as corn and cocoa can insure
their business against changes in underlying commodity prices between the time period in which
the commodity is produced and the future date at which it is to be sold. An effective way that the
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commodity producers figured out how to do this was to enter into an agreement with the
potential buyer of that commodity. This agreement provided the commodity producer the right,
but not the obligation, to sell the commodity to the buyer at a pre-negotiated fixed price, or strike
price, on some future date. Also known as a put option, the commodity producer in this case
would purchase, or go long, the put option and the commodity buyer would sell, or go short, the
put option. Alternatively, the commodity producer could agree to offer the commodity buyer the
option to buy the commodity from the producer at a pre-negotiated strike price on some future
date. Also known as a call option, the commodity buyer would purchase, or go long, the call
option and the commodity producer would sell, or go short, the call option. We can see how this
type of arrangement is similar to that of an auction house guarantee whereby the consignor of an
artwork purchases a put option from the auction house, or the right to sell the work during an
upcoming auction at a pre-determined minimum price.
The general and most basic idea behind the pricing mechanism for stock options is not so
dissimilar from that of auction house guarantees. An analyst or investor pricing an options
contract can first look at the underlying stock price associated with that contract and determine a
set of probabilities around what the price of that stock will be when the option contract expires.
The expected value of a call option will therefore be the max of 0, or the difference between all
potential outcomes for the stock’s actual price and the option’s strike price weighted by the
probability of each potential stock price coming to fruition. And vice versa, the expected value of
a put option will therefore be the max of 0, or the difference between the options strike price and
all potential outcomes for the stock’s actual price weighted by the probability of each potential
stock price coming to fruition (Natenberg, 64). Typically, the most likely outcome for the stock
price will be the prices closest to the stock’s current price (106). Similar to an auction house
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placing their greatest confidence around the “base” case event that a painting sells at or around
their estimates, the buyer or seller of an option will decide what they believe to be the most
likely price outcomes for the underlying asset at the expiration of option contract.
There are three main factors that will drive the premium associated with buying and
selling options contracts, two of which will be relevant to our analysis of guarantees for
artworks. Those two being the “moneyness” of the option contract – the difference between
where the underlying asset price is trading at and the strike price of the option contract – and the
volatility of the underlying asset prices (Lhabitant, 145). With regard to “moneyness” it is easy
enough to expect that the greater the price of underlying asset relative to strike price, the greater
the premium cost of a call option and vice versa. On the flip side, the lower the price of
underlying asset relative to the option’s strike price, the greater the premium cost of a put option
and vice versa.
With regard to volatility, it is important to recognize that, as measure of risk, volatility
really alludes to the number of potential future outcomes that may exist (whether known or
unknown). The greater the number of potential future outcomes for an assets value, the greater
the volatility associated with that asset. The fewer the number of potential future outcomes for an
assets value, the lower the volatility associated with that asset. So, when thinking about the
expected value of an option contract, it makes sense that, the greater the number of potential
outcomes the more outcomes that exist which could result in the underlying asset trading in the
money, or above strike price, at expiration and thus the greater the potential value of that contract
and cost associated with the contract’s premium. As a result, you can expect higher levels of
volatility to correspond with higher premiums for an option contract. And further, if that
volatility adjusts over time, the value of the option contract will increase or decrease accordingly.
11

The third factor which is less relevant to this analysis is the effect that risk free interest
rates and time play in the pricing of option contracts. However, since the value of a specific
artwork should, in theory, not change between the time of consignment and the sale of the work
at auction, time as a factor in pricing the guarantee should not be a factor. In addition, since
interest rates are in effect very near zero and artwork does not yield any type of financial
dividend, we can ignore the impact that interest rates have on guarantee pricing at the moment.
Two economists who also saw the similarities between guarantees made for artwork and options
contract used in financial markets attempted to build a pricing model for artwork guarantees
using the fundamental pricing theories underpinning that of options contracts.
3.3 Theoretical Options-Based Pricing Model
In their recent research paper titled “An options-based approach to analyze auction
guarantees in the art market,” authors Ventura Charlin and Arturo Cifuentes attempt to apply the
fundamental pricing mechanisms for options contracts to a theoretical pricing model of risk
taken on by auction house and third-party guarantors when they guarantee works of art at auction
(2020). I will save the reader a complete walk-through of their mathematical hypotheses –
although I would incline the reader to read their article if they would like to dig deeper into the
weeds mathematically – and will simplify the methodology as follows:
1. Determine guarantee price (Ω), mean expected price (μ) achieved at auction, standard
deviation (σ) around that price, and sell-through rate (ρ = 1 – the probability of lot going
unsold or being “bought-in”).
2. Calculate downside risk (E(D)) by assessing distribution of outcomes that hammer falls at
or below guarantee price and the dollar value of that risk (Eq. 2)
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3. Attribute fair value or “risk-neutral” price to the corresponding put option (P* = – E(D))
(Eq. 3).
4. Calculate upside risk (E(U)) by assessing distribution of outcomes that hammer falls at or
above guarantee price and the dollar value of that risk (Eq. 5).
5. Derive fair value or “risk-neutral” overage share (β*) (Eq. 6 and 7):
β* E(U) = – E(D) = P*
thus yielding,

β* = −

!(#)
!(%)

=

&∗
!(%)

This pricing methodology may seem different from that of a put option but it’s really
very similar. Recall, the first step to pricing a stock option is determining the probability of the
stock trading at different prices around the option’s strike price at the expiration of the option
contract. Once you have done that you can calculate the expected value of the option contract
and thus estimate the cashflow position for the holder when the price of the stock trades at, above
or below the option’s strike price. We know the contracts are fairly valued when the value of the
opposing bets taken on that trade (i.e. the value of the put option and call option) meet the putcall parity condition documented in financial literature (Brearley and Myers, 1991) as follows: C
– P = S – K, where C is the value of the call option, P the value of the put option, S the spot price
of the underlying asset, and K the strike price.
Here, what Cifuentes and Charlin did to appropriate that pricing model, was substitute
the value of the put and call options with the estimate of both the expected upside risk, E(U), and
the expected downside risk, E(D). In doing so they prove mathematically that the spot price (S)
can be attributed to the expected price for the artwork (ρμ) and that the strike price (K) can be
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attributed to the guarantee (Ω). This relationship still holds if we want to assume an overage
share (β) other than the risk-neutral overage share (β*) and back into a risk-neutral guarantee
(Ω*) that compensates for put-call parity as follows:
Ω* = ρµ − β𝐸(𝑈) + E(D)
Now that we have the fair values of both the guarantee risk, or put option, that the
consignor is receiving as well as the resulting overage share that the guarantor should be
compensated for, Charlin and Cifuentes provide a break out of their model into three main
scenarios: one the auction house’s risk position when they make a guarantee and do not transfer
the risk, two the auction house’s risk position when they make a guarantee and do transfer some
or all of the risk in the form of an irrevocable bid, and three when a third-party takes on all or
part of that risk in the form of an irrevocable bid. In order to analyze each of these three
scenarios, Cifuentes and Charlin apply a repeatable methodology that, when deemed appropriate,
I will adjust and add on to in an effort to further account for real-world considerations. I will also
deploy the methodology empirically so as to analyze the risk positions associated with
guarantees made for a specific artist’s secondary market auctions over time.
The first scenario in which the auction house decides to hold the risk associated with their
guarantee, and not transfer all or part of it in the form of a third-party irrevocable bid can be
summarized as follows:
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1. Assuming guarantee price (Ω), expected mean auction result (μ), standard deviation of
those results (σ), sell-through rate for that artist’s market (ρ), share in overage
compensated (β), and potential sales commission earned (c):1
a. Estimate expected risk payoff E(RP) based on E(D), overage share of E(U), and
potential commission earned (Eq. 8).
b. Determine price, XL, at which guarantor incurs a loss (i.e. break-even price) (Eq.
9).
c. Estimate the probability of a loss, PL, occurring along with the expected loss,
E(L), assuming there is a loss by assessing the distribution and value of outcomes
where a loss is incurred (Eq. 10 and 13).
d. Estimate the probability of a gain, PG = 1- PL, occurring along with the expected
gain, E(G), assuming there is a gain by assessing the distribution and value of
outcomes where a profit is made (Eq. 14).
e. Estimate the expected payoff = (expected loss x probability of loss) + (expected
gain x probability of gain)
f. Estimate the expected economic payoff, E(EP) as follows:2
𝐸(𝐸𝑃) = (𝐸(𝐿) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) + (𝐸(𝐺) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛)
g. Asses risk-reward profile using the λ metric defined as follows (Eq. 19).

1

Note, β applied to the model may differ from risk-neutral β* if we choose to do so.

2

Please note that the addition of the expected economic payoff, E(EP), was not defined by Charlin and Cifuentes but
was instead added by me for the purposes of providing an additional payoff estimate more closely linked to economic
levels such as break-even price that guarantors, and specifically auction houses, might care to look at in addition to
the payoff of the risk position. We will see in the following sections that both measures of payoff are, as you would
imagine, closely linked, but can provide slightly more accurate measures under different scenarios.
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λ= −

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸(𝐺)
∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸(𝐿)

Plainly named after its Greek letter, the Lambda ( l ) computation provides a useful
visualization of any particular guarantee structure’s risk/reward profile and will be relied upon at
numerous points throughout this essay to analyze the overall risk picture of guarantees made for
a particular artist’s work at auction. A value of l = 1 describes a risk-neutral position while a l >
1 insinuates a relatively safe position from the standpoint of the guarantor and vice-versa. The l
ratio will provide us a standardized measure by which we can compare the relative attractiveness
of guarantees not only made within a particular artist market over time but also, later in this
paper, across different artist markets at any given point in time.
The next scenario, in which the auction house decides not to hold the risk associated with
their guarantee and instead transfers all or part of the risk in the form of a third-party irrevocable
bid, can be summarized as follows:
1. Assuming guarantee price (Ω), expected mean auction result (μ), standard deviation of
those results (σ), sell-through rate for that artist’s market (ρ), new share in overage
compensated (β*1), potential sales commission earned (c), and fixed financing fee paid
(P):
a. Estimate expected risk payoff E(RP) based on overage share of E(U), and
potential commission earned (Eq. 20).
b. Determine price, XL, at which guarantor incurs a loss (i.e. break-even price) (Eq.
21)
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c. Estimate the probability of a loss, PL, occurring along with the expected loss,
E(L), assuming there is a loss by assessing the distribution and value of outcomes
where a loss is incurred (Eq. 22, 24, and 28).
d. Estimate the probability of a gain, PG = 1 - PL, occurring along with the expected
gain, E(G), assuming there is a gain by assessing the distribution and value of
outcomes where a profit is made (Eq. 25 and 30).
e. Estimate the expected economic payoff, E(EP).
f. Asses risk-reward profile using the λ metric (Eq. 19).
The final scenario in which the third-party takes on the risk associated with the guarantee in the
form of an irrevocable-bid can be summarized as follows:
1. Assuming irrevocable bid price3 (Ω2), expected mean auction result (μ), standard
deviation of those results (σ), sell-through rate for that artist’s market (ρ), share in
overage compensated (α), potential sales commission paid (c), and fixed financing fee
earned (P):
a. Estimate expected risk payoff, E(RP), based on E(D), overage share of E(U) and
fixed financing fee earned (Eq. 31).
b. Determine price, XL, at which guarantor incurs a loss (i.e. break-even price) (Eq.
32)

3

For the sake of simplicity, our analysis we will assume the irrevocable bid price is set at the same level of initial
auction house guarantee price.
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c. Estimate the probability of a loss, PL, occurring along with the expected loss,
E(L), assuming there is a loss by assessing the distribution and value of outcomes
where a loss is incurred (Eq. 33 and 35).
d. Estimate the probability of a gain, PG = 1 - PL, occurring along with the expected
gain, E(G), assuming there is a gain by assessing the distribution and value of
outcomes where a profit is made (Eq. 37).
e. Estimate the expected economic payoff, E(EP).
f. Asses risk-reward profile using the λ metric (Eq. 19).
The one update made to the final scenario was an incorporation of the third-party’s
obligation to pay a buyer’s premium to the auction house in the case that they ultimately win the
auction and are obligated to purchase the work at the pre-determined guarantee price.
Additionally, and although a point of somewhat inconsequence, it is worth noting here that, since
auction houses do not typically pay the fixed financing fee upfront, the fee is more likely than
not to be paid out of the auction house’s commissions after the conclusion of the auction. This
reality has been incorporated into my model’s break-even prices, expected losses, and expected
gains where an irrevocable bid is involved. The final adjustment I will make relates to an integral
assumption made by Charlin and Cifuentes in their proofing and analysis of the options-based
approach – that being a normal distribution of outcomes around the pre-sale expert estimates.
This is an assumption that we will both test in our application to a contemporary artist market
and adjust for accordingly based on our findings.
3.4 Application of Options-Based Approach to Specific Artist Market – Gerhard Richter
3.4.1

Why Richter?
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When choosing a baseline artist to first apply the Charlin and Cifuentes’ option-based
pricing model to, I took into consideration a few different parameters. I first wanted to identify
an artist with an established track record at auction over the previous 10 years. I second wanted
to identify an artist whose secondary auction market represented a significant volume of auction
sales over that same time period and on an annual basis. Third, I wanted to analyze an artist’s
market whose work is regularly guaranteed by auction houses and third parties. Lastly, from an
art historical standpoint, I wanted to identify an artist who is widely considered to have cemented
their position in the art historical canon. Having both works owned by and retrospectives held at
the world’s most distinguished museums, Gerhard Richter’s artist market presented itself as an
ideal basis for analysis. With approximately 1,460 lots sold at auction over the previous 10 years,
$1.62 billion in sales over that same time period, and $85.4 million sold in 2020 alone, Richter
has been a staple of the post-war and contemporary auction market (Art Price). The artist’s
works are regularly guaranteed at auction and was listed as number three on the list of
ArtTactic’s Top 10 Artists by Guarantee Value between 2016 and 2019 with over $230 million
in guaranteed value representing 33 lots over that time period. Scraping the major auction
databases for a complete set of the artist’s auction records would be the next step towards
applying our options-based approach.
3.4.2

Sample Set and Constraints
There are two major raw data points required for input into the options based model: the

auction house experts’ low and high estimates and the hammer price. In order to gather this data,
I scraped auction records from the ARTBank database going back to 2010, and quality checked
my dataset against both ArtNet and Art Price records. Once I had re-created a database of
Richter’s past auction sales, I then filtered out any sales of three-dimensional works (e.g.,
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sculpture) and non-original two-dimensional works (e.g., prints and multiples). In order to avoid
including works that could overly-skew the analysis, I further filtered out any works with a low
auction house estimates of less than $10,000 as well as works that did not carry any auction
house estimates. What we are left with are the auction records for all of Richter’s unique, twodimensional works accompanied by an auction house low estimate of at minimum $10,000.4
3.4.3

Application of the Options-Based Model
Once I was confident in the completeness of my raw dataset, I could begin my attempt to

apply the Charlin/Cifuentes pricing model to that dataset. The next step of which required
determining mean price expectations for Richter’s work at auction as well as the standard
deviation around those expected prices. Since we are using empirical auction results to observe
deviation, the latter can be drawn from the standard deviation of those auction results once the
value of the work is taken into account. With regard to the former, the greater part of empirical
evidence points to un-biased auction house expert estimates. In their paper “A Theory of
Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Paul Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (1982) argued that
experts are incentivized to provide honest estimates under most auction models. Orley
Ashenfelter (1989) confirmed this argument showing auction house estimates as empirically
truthful since estimates are highly correlated with prices achieved. McAndrew, Smith, and

4

Note, although a guarantor is unlikely to guarantee a work that is valued below some absolute level, I decided to
include those works in the empirical data for two reasons. One, the inclusion of lots below that absolute value allow
for greater populations of data and thus more complete statistical analyses – especially when we later attempt to apply
this model to artist markets with varying degrees of historical records and relative prices. Two, that absolute price
level at which guarantors are willing to guarantee a work of art has been steadily decreasing over the years as evidenced
by the decreased average guarantee prices at Sotheby’s and Phillips since 2016 (ArtTactic Auction Guarantee Report
– December 2019). So, attempting to set that minimum value (which certainly varies by artist) may be an arbitrary
exercise and will instead be accounted for by analyzing each lot relative to its pre-sale estimates.
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Thompson (2009) took this evidence a step further by showing that, as long as you are
accounting for unsold works of art in the sample set, a bias did not exist.
Thus, rather than attempting to come up with our own appraisal of each artwork included
in the model, it makes sense to rely on the auction house expert estimates as a basis for mean
price expectations. However, in McAndrew’s book “Fine Art and High Finance” the author notes
that “a simple reason for the bias found in some samples of auction data may arise out of expert’s
errors, even systematic ones in some cases” (pg. 98). In other words, McAndrew’s conclusion
from the strong empirical evidence is that, if estimates are generally good estimators of an
artworks expected value, then the deviation of actual auction results around these expected
values can be a useful measure for downside [and upside] risk. That deviation can be visualized
by calculating the ratio between hammer prices and their mean pre-sale estimates (i.e. actual
results vs expected results), a tool coined by McAndrew and Thompson (2007) as the hammer
ratio (HR), and plotting the distribution of those ratios in a histogram.

𝐻𝑅 =

𝐻𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒

By computing the hammer ratios for all of Richter’s auction results going back to 2010,
we can plot a distribution of hammer ratios or deviations that accounts for the value of the
works.5 In doing so, we would expect to see a normal distribution of outcomes around mean
estimates (HR = 1), however what we find instead is a distribution shape with parameters

5

In the case where lots went unsold or where “bought-in” a hammer ratio of 0.5 was assumed in its place.
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Chart 1

(μ = 1.16, σ = 0.58) that more closely resembles a log normal behavior with a positive skew to
the right. Applying the Jarque-Bera test for normalcy on the population (n=639) of Richter
auction records confirms that the distribution of Hammer Ratios is not normal, but rather has a
statistically significant positive skew to the right. We further prove that the distribution is
Lognormal by taking the natural log of the hammer ratios and testing the transformed data set
with parameters (0.14, 0.42) for normalcy. After applying the Jarque-Bera test for normalcy on
the transformed, random sample of hammer ratios, we conclude that the transformed dataset
meets our requirement for normalcy and thus the original distribution is indeed LogNormal.
This conclusion is important for two reasons. The first is that, if we assume auction house
estimates are un-biased, and thus the mean estimate is a fair estimate of mean expected prices,
then the standard deviation applied against those expected prices should be that of the log
transformed dataset up to but not including the specific sale we are modeling. The second is that,
if the Charlin and Cifuentes’ pricing model assumes normally distributed auction results around
mean estimates in determining the probability of specific economic levels (e.g. guarantee and
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break-even price) occurring, then we should more appropriately apply statistical functions such
as N(x), the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Given the lognormal distribution
of our empirical dataset, I will attempt to better reflect the probability of getting an occurrence
less than x, or greater than x ( 1 – N(x) ). If x is some number of standard deviations away from
the mean, then we can do this by making some simple adjustments to the value of x when
calculating its number of standard deviation units away from the expected mean. Since the actual
mean hammer prices (HR = 1.16) empirically fall to the right of the actual median hammer
prices (HR = 1.03), then the probability of an occurrence to the left of the mean price should be
less than it would otherwise be under standard normal distribution conditions with mean and
median expected hammer price (HR = 1). In their analysis, Cifuentes and Charlin standardize x
for both the guarantee price (Ω±) and break-even prices (XL±).

Ω± =

(*+

and,

,

XL± =

-. * +
,

In a normal distribution this relationship between (Ω – μ) and (XL – μ) properly reflects
the relationship (S – K) between strike price (K) and underlying spot price (S) associated with
options contracts. However, in Sheldon Natenberger’s book “Option Volatility And Pricing,” the
author turns to the Black-Sholes model, the first widely used model for option pricing, that
defines this relationship in a lognormal distribution as (pg. 552)
𝑆
ln H K
𝐾
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So if S > K, this value is a positive one, and the call option is in the money (or out of the money
for the put option), and if S < K, this value is a negative one, and the call option is out of the
money (or in the money for the put option). With the mean empirical price outcome to the right
of our median, we must next shift the mean of N(x) by some amount to capture its elongated
right tail. The size of this shift depends on the standard deviation of our lognormal distribution –
the higher the standard deviation the, the longer the right tail, and consequently the greater the
shift we need to make to the right of the mean – and is given by (pg. 553)
𝑆
σ/
ln H K + L O
𝐾
2
Lastly, we must covert this measure into some number of standard deviation and can do so by
dividing it by the standard deviation of our lognormal distribution (pg. 553)
𝑆
σ/
ln P𝐾Q + H 2 K
σ
After applying this adjustment to our guarantee price and break-even prices we end up with the
following.

Ω± =

µ
σ/
ln P Ω Q + H 2 K

𝑋𝐿± =

σ

and,

µ
σ/
ln P𝑋𝐿Q + H 2 K
σ

Although Charlin and Cifuentes attempted to apply the entirety of the Black-Sholes
model to their analysis deeming it inappropriate for the use within the context of fine art, I felt it
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was reasonable here to appropriate this particular aspect of the Black-Scholes model and
incorporate it into the Charlin/Cifuentes model.6
Now that we have our mean expected price outcomes, the expected error for those
outcomes, an assumed guarantee level (90% of Low Estimate), and an assumed third-party split
(50/50) in claim to overage share, we can begin applying the model to Richter’s historical
auction sales from the three different guarantor perspectives previously discussed. In applying
the model to our population of auction sales, it is important to note that, although we are using
empirical data (e.g., historical auction results) to build our basis for the probability of specific
outcomes occurring, as well as the standard deviation of our mean expected outcome, we are
only using the empirical data available up to but not including the sale in question. And since we
are using mean pre-sale estimates as the basis for our expected price outcome, we are effectively
employing the model using prior auction sales but on a forward looking basis – as if the sale had
not yet happened.
One major benefit to this approach is that, knowing the inevitable outcome of the sale, we
can calculate a realistic approximation of what both the auction house and third-party guarantors
would have actually earned based on the final hammer price and our model’s inputs. We can
then compare this “hypothetical actual payoff” to our model’s expected payoffs and gauge the

6

Note: because the Black Scholes model assumes a relatively liquid trading market for the underlying asset and
enumerates a forward price of the underlying asset at expiration of the option that is different from the current spot
price, this lognormal adjustment to N(x) includes an interest rate and time component. However, these components
were withheld from this analysis for two reasons. In the world of art auctions, where the underlying asset being priced
is particularly illiquid (it does not trade publicly and does not pay any type of financial dividend) and is typically
consigned to the auction house a relatively short time before the auction sale is held (approximately 3 months or less
in some cases), we have little reason to believe that the expected price for the work will materially change between
consignment and auction.
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accuracy of our model’s expected payoffs or, conversely, the over/under performance of the
guarantee’s actual performance relative to expectations.
3.4.4

Analysis of Model Outputs
After applying the model to all lots in of our sample set of Richter’s work at auction, I

then calculated the following trailing five-year averages from our model’s key outputs: riskneutral overage shares (β*, β*1, α); the fixed income fee paid (-P*) or earned (P*) as a percent of
guarantee price; the expected risk return, expected economic return, and hypothetical actual
return all as a rate of return percentage based on guarantee price; the overall risk/reward profile
(λ); and finally the Sharpe Ratio (a financial measure of risk-adjust returns) for actual returns
calculated as 7
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
After seeing these results (Table 1), you may think guaranteeing work by Gerhard Richter
has been a profitable investment, and it has been, but it’s important we remind ourselves that a
significant portion of those returns come in the form of commissions earned (~21%) by the
auction house and fixed financing fees (~15%) earned by the third-party irrevocable bidder. 8,9
Nevertheless, the guarantees are still an attractive proposition. Even if it means the auction house

7

Due to the current historically low levels of interest rates and the short period of time between consignment and
auction sale, the risk free rate will be assumed at 0%.
8

Sales commission consists of buyer’s premium charged to the winning bidder and does not include potential
commission charged to seller since guaranteed nature of sale insinuates no sellers commission charged to consignor.
9

For the purposes of my analysis, and because buyer’s premiums charged by auction houses have materially
changed over the years, I calculated expected commission based on specific auction house policy at the time of sale.
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has to give up a portion of their buyer’s premium for top value lots in order to win the
consignment for their auction. And we can see this occurring when we break down the results by
the top-quartile of lots (higher value works) and bottom 75% of lots (lower value works) based
on pre-sale low estimates.
Breaking down our data by lot value provides us useful information that may point to
some interesting insights into Richter’s guarantee market, and our model’s pricing of
hypothetical guarantees for Richter’s work sold at auction over the previous five years. The first
being that, in general, the hypothetical guarantees for the lower value works outperform the
higher value works on both an absolute basis (i.e. expected risk return, expected economic
return, and actual return), relative basis (i.e. deviation between expected and actual returns), and
risk-adjusted basis (actual Sharpe Ratio and λ). This leads me to believe that the model may to be
overestimating the risk-neutral overage share (β* = 0.40) necessary to compensate for the risk
being taken by the guarantor when the lots fall outside the top quartile by low estimate. It also
justifies what would likely be a lower share in overage more in line with realistic industry
standards (~25% +/- 5%). The next point of interest is the accuracy of our model when applied to
lots in the top quartile of values by low estimate.
Here we see that, with the exception of the expected third-party economic return, the
deviation between expected and actual results is low. Further, in the case where the auction
house decides to keep the risk in-house, the economic return is a better estimator of actual
returns than the risk return. That may imply that the expected economic return’s binary nature of
analyzing guarantee gains and losses against break-even prices, when there are gains and losses,
does a better job of pricing upside risk when the driver of potential returns is more closely tied to
overage share. So, it makes sense logically that, when the auction house transfers the risk to a
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third party and gives up a good deal of the overage share, the expected risk return becomes a
better estimator of returns. This is likely because, in the case where the auction house transfers
the risk to a third-party, the expected risk return neutralizes the expected upside and downside
cashflows when applying a risk-neutral overage share and is instead driven by buyer’s premium
and fixed financing fees.
Table 1
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This observation also holds when considering the expected and actual returns for thirdparty irrevocable bids made on Richter’s higher value works versus lower value works. For
higher value works, we can see that the average actual return of 11% is actually less than the
average fixed financing fee of 14% which points to a detraction from a greater likelihood of
outcomes whereby the irrevocable bid is ultimately the winning bid and the third-party ends up
owning the work and realizing a loss on the guarantee. This should not be a problem, however, if
the irrevocable bidder is happy to own the artwork since they would have essentially received a
rebate on their buyer’s premium owed in the form of the fixed financing fee. On the flip side of
this are the lower value works where we can see that, on average, the actual return of 18%
exceeds the modeled fixed financing fee of 15% pointing to a greater probability of outcomes
where the irrevocable bid is being surpassed.
The general outperformance by the lower value works is not all too unsurprising when
you consider that, from 2016 to 2020, the average hammer ratio for Richter’s lower value works
was 1.10 versus 0.92 for the higher value works. The auction house’s slight under and over
estimation of pre-sale estimates for lower value and higher value works, respectively, addresses
the inherent challenge in valuing Richter’s work at auction and how that error impacts the
risk/reward profile of the hypothetical guarantees made for those works. We can also see how
changes to those errors over time drive our model outputs by looking at the results by each year
over the period 2016 to 2020.
3.4.5

Model Outputs Over Time

To see how the error in auction house estimates over time impacts the outputs of our model,
we can analyze the distribution of auction outcome’s for Richter’s work by looking at the mean
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hammer ratios and standard deviation of those hammer ratios from 2016 to 2020. By comparing
that empirical data to the risk outputs (β* and λ) of our model we can gain further insight into the
potential drivers of our model’s expected and actual returns (Chart 2).
Chart 2
Risk/Reward Profile vs Auction House Error and Risk-Neutral Overage
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Looking at the overall risk/reward profile of our guarantees as it compares to the riskneutral overage share being priced into our model, we can identify an inverse correlation
between the risk/reward profile and the empirical standard deviation of auction results. As the
realized standard deviation of results increases, the overall risk/reward profile of our guarantees
declines. To offset the increase in variance between expected and actual auction prices, our riskneutral beta increases. When thinking about the drivers behind our risk-neutral overage share,
there are two main things to consider: one, the probability that our assumed guarantee price is
achieved, and two the historical standard deviation or estimated error of our expected mean
hammer price. So, if that standard deviation is being measured by the empirical auction results
up to but not including the lot in question, we can expect our risk-neutral overage to increase in
order to compensate for that uncertainty.

30

Offsetting the uncertainty around potential auction results is the lognormal distribution of
empirical auction results being incorporated into our probability functions. However, the larger
the dataset of empirical observations the less impacted that data set will be by the more
immediate outcomes being experienced. So, just because our risk-neutral overage share increases
between 2016 and 2020 does not necessarily mean that the expected and actual returns of those
guarantees will correlate to the change in overage share. This sheds light on one of the major
drawbacks to the risk-neutral overage share calculation as a pricing mechanism: it is a lagging
indicator of volatility rather than a predictive one. This begs the question, what then drives the
actual returns of the hypothetical guarantees relative to their expected returns, and how does the
risk-neutral overage share impact our expected and actual returns?
The next table compares the expected and actual returns of the hypothetical guarantees to
the mean realized hammer ratios and the standard deviation of those hammer ratios for the lots
offered each year (Chart 3). What we see is that, with the exception of 2018 and 2020, the
model’s expected returns associated with the auction house risk positions are more or less in-line
with their actual returns. As mentioned previously, however, because the risk-neutral overage
share is a lagging indicator, and because it does not differentiate between upside and downside
volatility, it does not seem to be able to adequately reflect the auction house position’s increased
risk to the upside in the years 2018 and 2020. This is evidenced by the fact that the actual returns
of our hypothetical guarantees are, in large part, driven by overage share and actual auction
outcomes. Thus, when we get a year like 2018 and 2020 where the mean hammer ratio is 1.10
and 1.21, respectively, our model significantly underestimates actual returns.
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Chart 3
Expected and Actual Returns Over Time
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This shows us that we will experience greater relative deviations between expected and
actual returns occurs when mean hammer ratios increase above one and standard deviation
increases accordingly. Vice versa, lower relative deviations between expected and actual returns
occur when the mean hammer ratios decrease below one and standard deviation increases
accordingly. This makes sense mathematically when you consider the fact that a 10% move in
hammer ratio to the upside represents a 0.10 increase while a 10% move to the downside
represents a 0.09 decrease. Since up until now we have kept our main pricing levers (guarantee
price, risk-neutral overage share and fixed financing fees) relatively constant, we can next see
how sensitive our model’s outputs are to changes in those pricing levers by applying those
changes to a specific lot sold at auction recently.
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3.4.6

Model Sensitivity
When deciding which lot to focus our analysis of the risk positions’ sensitivity to changes

in guarantee price, overage share and fixed financing fee, it seemed appropriate to select a
recent example where an auction house guarantee and third-party irrevocable bid was in fact
present. As one of Richter’s most recognizable subjects and accompanied by both an auction
house and third-party financial interest, “ABSTRAKTES BILD” sold at Sotheby’s on
October 28, 2020, presented itself as just the choice (Figure 1 and Table 2).
Figure 1

Gerhard Richter, ABSTRAKTES BILD, 1989

Under our model’s base guarantee assumption (90% of low estimate) and risk-neutral
overage share, ABSTRAKTES BILD’s guarantee price was set at $1,800,000. Accordingly, the
expected downside risk E(D) and upside risk E(U) for the work is priced at -$277,941 and
$790,839, respectively, implying a risk neutral overage share of 35% and put price P* of
$277,941. Using these guarantee pricing inputs, we summarize the potential cashflow positions
for the auction house (Table 3).
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Table 2

Table 3

After assuming a 50% share in risk-neutral overage and an irrevocable bid at the auction
house’s same pre-negotiated guarantee price, we can then summarize the potential cashflow
position for the third-party (Table 4).
Table 4
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Because “ABSTRAKTES BILD” ended up selling at price significantly higher than our
expected mean price, the actual payoffs associated with the auction house and third-party
cashflow positions meaningfully exceeded our model’s expectations. However, this
outperformance does not fall outside the realm of potential expected outcomes in the context of
their estimated standard deviations. Regardless, it still warrants an investigation into how
sensitive those risk positions are to changes in guarantee price, overage share, and fixed
financing fee. The first risk position we will analyze is that of the auction house when it decides
to hold the guarantee risk in-house (Table 5).
Table 5
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The sensitivity analysis of the auction houses risk position when it holds the risk in-house
points to an important consideration when negotiating guarantee pricing: the guarantee price
itself has a more significant impact on the overall risk/reward profile of the auction house’s risk
position than the overage share charged above that guarantee price. To that end, the auction
house can effectively replicate the expected payoffs of our base assumptions (denoted in red) and
increase their overall risk/reward profile by lowering the guarantee price and decreasing its share
in upside cashflows. In the case of “ABSTRAKTES BILD”, a 1% decrease in guarantee price
corresponds to an approximate 4% decrease in necessary overage compensation. From this, we
can posit that the larger part of the auction house and consignor’s incentives lie with the
guarantee price itself when negotiating a guarantee. Next, by adjusting both the negotiated fixed
financing fee and relative split in their claim to the risk-neutral overage share of upside
Table 6
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Cashflows, we can analyze the sensitivity of the auction house and third-party risk positions
when the auction house transfers all or part of the guarantee risk to a third-party (Table 6 and 7).
In the case where the auction house purchases a put option from a third-party, it is clear
that both the auction house and third-party risk positions are more sensitive to changes in fixed
financing fees than their claims to share in upside cashflows. We see this occur as the fixed
financing fee and relative claim to upside cash flows deviates from our base assumptions of a
risk-neutral put price and 50/50 split in risk-neutral overage share (both denoted in red).
Table 7

However, it appears that the overall risk/reward profile of the auction house’s position is
exponentially more sensitive to changes in fixed financing fees than the third-party. This may
point to our model’s overestimation of the necessary fixed financing fee required to compensate
the third-party party for taking on the guarantee risk. The auction house should, as a result, have
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a greater incentivize during negotiations with the third-party to reduce the fixed financing fee
than the third-party may be to increase them. Knowing this, the third-party may be in an
advantageous position to negotiate a greater claim to the share in overage than they otherwise
would have been. Nevertheless, our analysis up until now shows us how important the fixed
financing fee can be to the expected and actual payoffs of the third-party position. This general
observation is supported by one the most common mistakes made by new third-party guarantors:
attempting to gain access to deal flow over more seasoned guarantors by offering ‘cheap capital’
in the form of lower financing fees/claim to upside cash flow (Woodham, 2018).

3.4.7

Summary of Findings
After applying the options-based approach to our model of hypothetical guarantees made

for Gerhard Richter’s work sold at auction we can summarize our findings thus far:
1. After accounting for commission earned by the auction house in the form of buyer’s
premium, the hypothetical guarantees made for Richter’s work suggest an attractive
investment opportunity as compared to the overall guarantee market’s (between 9%
and 12% from 2016 to 2019 according to ArtTactic’s Auction Guarantee Market
Report – 2016 to 2019).
2. Although the expected guarantee payoffs estimated by our model do deviate from the
actual performance of those guarantees, the model does, on average, seem to provide
a meaningful degree of accuracy when comparing the actual results to our expected
results on both a relative return basis, and within the context of the standard deviation
estimates for our expected payoffs.

38

3. The risk-neutral option pricing method has considerable drawbacks and may
underestimate upside risk, but is nevertheless an effective measure of downside risk,
and provides an important basis from which we can begin pricing guarantees more
efficiently.
4. The challenge imposed upon auction house experts to provide pre-sale estimates,
however unbiased, do come with a degree of error. And the analysis of those errors
points to a general outperformance of hypothetical guarantees made for lower value
works than higher value works.
This last finding leads us back to an important recognition by Charlin and Cifuentes that “the
most challenging task in this exercise is estimating the value of the painting, even knowing that
art experts provide on average good estimates of such value” (pg. 8). In light of this, we will
further explore the impact of this reality by applying the model to a group of artists whose
markets demonstrate varying degrees of error in experts’ estimate price.
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4

Differences In Guarantee Risk/Reward Profiles Among Multiple Artists
In the previous section, we demonstrated how the adjusted Cifuente/Charlin model faired

for an artist such as Gerhard Richter whose market transacts often and has a great deal of depth
to it. However, what happens when you apply the model to artist markets with varying degrees of
liquidity, stability and depth? Particularly artists of differing age, gender, race and relevance. To
further test the sensitivity of the model, it seemed that the next logical step was to expand the
sample population of artists included in the analysis. By doing so we are able to identify
commonalities among the guarantee profiles for groups of artist markets which the model can
help explain, and unique qualities, or idiosyncrasies, that are less easily observable.
In order to perform this exercise, we must first define our selection parameters and
determine an appropriate basket of artists to include in our sample. Then we can apply the
option-based pricing model demonstrated with Gerhard Richter in the previous section. Finally,
we can attempt to draw insights from our findings using comparative risk statistics and
supporting anecdotal evidence. These insights will help practitioners to better manage the risks
associated with the guarantees they make for artwork at auction. One of those insights that we
will attempt to shed light on is the model’s sensitivity to the accuracy of historical auction results
compared to the auction house expert’s unbiased pre-sale estimates and specifically how that
relative level of accuracy varies by artist.
4.1 Definition of Research Parameters
Before applying the options based pricing model to additional artists, I had to decide
which artists to include in the sample set. Those inclusions were based a number of factors that I
felt would make the analysis not only systematic but also insightful. In order to hammer down
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the universe of eligible artists (pun very much intended), I first reduced that universe by focusing
on the art historical timeframe that encompasses post-war and later – excluding artists from
earlier time periods such as the modern, impressionist and old master periods. I then focused on
artist markets by their volume of art sales at auction for any given artist market over the previous
five years. To this end, each artist had to have a minimum $1 million worth of average, annual
auction sales turnover during that period. Of those artists, I required each artist market have a
minimum of 50 auction records available. Further, I only considered auction records for that
minimum data set that were unique, two-dimensional works (i.e., no sculpture or multiples) with
a minimum low auction house estimate of $10,000.
Of those artists still available at this point, I began to choose a group of artists that I felt
was fairly representative of the contemporary art world we live in today. I would like to caveat
that this selection of artists is by no means a comprehensive picture of today’s contemporary art
landscape and that my choices were of course subjective to some degree. That said, a diverse
range of ages, gender, race and nationality was one of my main overarching considerations when
deciding which artists to include in the final sample set. And to that point, the greatest limitation
to including more artists from specific subsets was the amount of publicly available auction
records that are at our disposal. For example, there are not many black female artists who have a
long enough track record of public auction sales to be able to gain insights from this analysis (a
topic in of itself that could take on an entirely different thesis). So, rather than attempt to
generalize conclusions gleamed from a single artist’s market to all similar artists, I will instead
use the artists selected in this analysis as anecdotal data points in their own right. To that end, the
sample of artists included in this leg of our analysis is as follows:
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Table 8

4.2 Comparative Risk Statistics
Now that we can move forward with applying our model to this basket of artists, I will
first lay out an additional statistical tool that we will deploy to compare the relative error
associated with each artist’s auction estimates in addition to the mean and standard deviation of
hammer ratios – the coefficient of variation (CV). Also referred to as relative standard deviation
(RSD), the coefficient of variation helps us to standardize the measure of dispersion among a
probability distribution. It is useful because it allows us to understand the standard deviation of
data within the context of that dataset’s mean value. We will see that, in our analysis, the CV
will provide a useful measure of relative levels of dispersion among the lognormal distribution of
hammer ratios for each artist market where the means may vary meaningfully. The coefficient of
variation for a lognormally-distributed data (CVLN) set is estimated as

#
𝐶𝑉.1 = b𝑒 2!" − 1
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where sln is the sample standard deviation of the data set after a natural log transformation
(Koopman, Owen and Rosenblatt, 1964).
Table 9

In Table 9, rather than looking solely at the standard deviation of hammer ratios across
artist markets, we can see how those standard deviations of hammer ratios stack up relative to the
mean hammer ratio by looking at the differences in CVLN across multiple artist markets. While
there is a general level of variance across all artists, that variance differs greatly by artist.
Grouping the sample set of artists into subsets defined by their respective contemporary art
categories further shows us how those risk measures vary by type of artist and gives us a sneak
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peek into how the guarantee profiles for the different types of artists may be impacted.10 For
example, we can see that although the relative standard deviation of lognormal distributions for
the Postwar artists I selected are, on average, lower than that of Contemporary and UltraContemporary artists selected, the significantly larger positive skew in their empirical datasets
leads to a greater spread between modeled upside and downside risk than Contemporary artists,
as shown in Table 10. Similarly, although the positive of skews of the Ultra-Contemporary artist
markets are more or less in line with that of the Contemporary artists, the greater relative
standard deviations (CVLN) for those artists, on average, will also result in a greater spread
between upside and downside risk than the Contemporary subset.
Table 10

10

Artist categories based on the following Artnet definitions: Postwar artists comprise artists born between 1911
and 1944, Contemporary artists comprise artists born between 1945 and 1974, and Ultra-Contemporary artists
comprise artists born after 1974.
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These differences in upside and downside risk spread will in-turn drive the risk-neutral
overage share modeled by the options-based approach. Interestingly, we can see that the modeled
upside and downside risk spread for the selection of Postwar artists is driven by a decrease in
risk to the downside, while that of the Ultra-Contemporary artists is driven by an increase to the
upside. This is good to see since it reflects what you would expect to happen in reality. An
additional point to make is that, due to the small sample size of artists included, the impact of
outliers on their subset can be highly influential. For example, due to a disappointing stretch of
time when artwork by Dana Schutz was not selling well at auction (as seen by the low guarantee
hit rate), the inclusion of her artist market greatly weighs on the risk/reward profile of the UltraContemporary category as a whole. With this in mind, we will next look at how those
risk/reward profiles translate into modeled expected and actual payoffs.
4.3 Analysis of Model Outputs for Multiple Artists
The methodology by which I have applied the option-based approach to each of the artist
markets is the same as that of Gerhard Richter. The organization of the results will accordingly
be studied from the perspective of the auction house taking on the risk associated with the
guarantees, the auction house transferring that risk, and a third-party taking on all or party of the
risk in the form of an irrevocable bid. Under each risk position, we will look at the overall
risk/reward profiles, expected payoffs, and actual payoffs of hypothetical guarantees made for
the artists’ works sold assuming guarantee prices at 90% of low estimates, risk-neutral option
pricing, and a 50/50 split in overage where a third-party is involved. In order to compare those
results on a more apples-to-apples basis, we will remove the results of each artist’s relatively
lower value works by only analyzing results for lots that fall in the top quartile of each artist
market by value. With the exception of Eddie Martinez who’s results could only be analyzed
45

going back to the beginning of 2019 due to insufficient auction records, Tables 11, 12, and 13
summarize our findings in the form of averages over the previous 5 years (2016 to 2020).
Table 11
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The first thing we will notice when seeing the expected and actual payoffs of the
hypothetical guarantees under each artist subset is that the guarantees made on behalf of
Table 12
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our Contemporary and Ultra-Contemporary artists seemed to outperform those of the Postwar
artists. However, we must remember that, if we ignore buyer’s premium and fixed financing
Table 13
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fees, the drivers of actual payoffs are two-fold: one the share in overage claimed by the
guarantor, and two the expected and actual performance of the artworks at auction. So, when we
see the guarantees for our Contemporary artists outperform that of Postwar artists, we can
attribute much of that outperformance to the meaningfully higher levels of overage share claimed
in order to maintain a risk-neutral position. On the other hand, in the case of the UltraContemporary artists, where the risk-neutral overage share is more or less in-line with those of
the Postwar artists, the outperformance can be attributed to greater expectations and realized
results around their auction prices relative to pre-sale estimates. These observations, however, do
not necessarily explain the differences in the artists’ overall risk/reward profiles as defined by
our λ metric.
Unsurprisingly, what we are seeing cause the difference in risk/reward profile for each
artist’s guarantee market is much the same as the cause of difference in our risk-neutral option
pricing – the standard deviation of outcomes among each artist’s empirical dataset, or more
specifically the relative standard deviation of outcomes as measured by CVLN. The artist markets
with lower relative standard deviations in auction prices as compared to the mean outcomes, on
average, also have more conservative, or safer, risk/reward profiles for guarantees. Furthermore,
the most attractive guarantee opportunities occur when we couple a low relative standard
deviation with an increasing number of outcomes where auction prices exceed mean pre-sale
estimates. We see this occurring in our sample set of artists for Rashid Johnson where the CVLN
of his empirical auction results (0.40) is low compared to the other artists, and the mean hammer
ratio of those auction results has been trending higher over the previous five years (1.27 since
2016). In other words, artist markets where estimates are inaccurate to the upside, but inaccurate
with a relatively high degree of precision, seem to present the most favorable guarantee profiles.
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Intuitively, these relationships make sense when you consider the impact that volatility
and “moneyness” have on traditional option value. Recall that the premiums or price for a
contract increase with higher levels of volatility and decrease with lower levels of volatility. So,
as the buyer or holder of an option contract you are actively seeking opportunities to buy or go
long options contracts where you believe the market is underpricing the volatility associated with
the underlying asset. Conversely, as the seller or issuer of an option contract, you are actively
seeking opportunities to sell or go short options contracts where you believe the market is
overpricing the volatility associated with the underlying asset.
Since our guarantee pricing model is from the perspective of the guarantors or sellers of
the guarantees or options, we can expect the guarantor’s risk position to be positively or
negatively impacted by respectively lower or higher levels of relative volatility. Additionally, the
“moneyness” of the guarantees – which can be thought of as the difference in implied auction
prices (as observed by historical hammer ratios) and the price at which the guarantee is set –
have a significant impact on the pricing and performance of that guarantee. It is important to note
that the effect of this driver is potentially amplified by that fact that the model assumes a fixed
guarantee rate relative to the artwork’s low estimate. Nevertheless, as the volatility and
“moneyness” for an artist’s guarantee market change, so too will our model’s pricing and
expected payoffs for those guarantees.
Summary of Findings
After applying the options-based approach to multiple artists, we can summarize our
findings as follows:
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1. The variance in expected and actual auction prices does differ by artist and those
differences in variation can be linked to differences in the risk/reward profile and payoffs
of hypothetical guarantees made for those artists’ work sold at auction.
2. Although the volatility associated with our younger artist’s markets may be greater, on
average, than that of more established artists, that volatility relative to mean empirical
outcomes for a younger artist’s market may present a more attractive guarantee
opportunity from the standpoint of the guarantor.
3. Since the actual returns of an artist’s guarantee market are not purely driven by the
general risk associated with guarantees there is a portion of those returns that are driven
by idiosyncratic, or unrelated, factors which can provide unique benefits within the
context of a group of different artists.
Our findings up until this stage point to a number of potential implications for guarantees made
by both auction houses and third-parties.
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5

Insights/Takeaways

5.1 Implications for Auction House and Third-Party Guarantors
Because of the shortcomings and drawbacks to our analysis (discussed in the next
section), the options-based approach may be better used as a tool for empirical analysis of
historical auction house guarantee performance, and thus an input for future tweaks to pricing,
but less as a substitution for the current auction house pricing methodology. In effect, the
information gleamed from our model could be deployed as a mechanism of re-pricing guarantees
where inefficiencies exist rather than pricing the guarantees for an artist market that is in fact
efficiently priced. That said, the options-based model applied in this paper may be more
applicable for third-party guarantors who do not have access to the same level of sales
intelligence that auction houses have nor the ability to set the initial guarantee level and overall
size of overage fee charged to the consignor.
As a result of their negotiating position, third-party guarantors are more reliant on
empirical data when making reactive decisions around guarantee pricing. In addition, the model
can provide third-party guarantors with a tool to try and identify relatively overpriced or
underpriced risk within specific artist markets. If proven able to successfully identify those
relative mis-pricings in practice, then third-party guarantors could attempt to seek guarantee
opportunities that are relatively more attractive and avoid those that are relatively less attractive.
At the very least, and regardless of its practicality, the application of the options-based model as
an educational exercise offers an injection of quantitative data and transparency into guarantee
markets that for the most part has remained opaque. Another way that third-party guarantors can
use this model is basis from which to contextualize expert pre-sale estimates.
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5.2 Auction House Expert Estimates
As previously discussed, the greater part of empirical evidence points to auction house
estimates being non-biased. That doesn’t mean, however, that they can’t demonstrate varying
amounts of error for whatever reasons. If that empirical error can be identified, which I believe
we have proven in this paper, then guarantors of artwork should be able to use that information
to better inform their decisions when making guarantees for specific types of artists and
artworks. For example, if a third-party guarantor is presented with a guarantee opportunity
whereby the potential claim to upside cashflows has been bounded by the auction house’s
guarantee to the consignor, then the third-party could theoretically contextualize that overage
within our model’s estimate of risk-neutral overage share and accordingly negotiate a claim to
that share in upside cashflow that appropriately compensates for the risk they are taking on. One
the challenges that auction house experts face when estimating the price of an artwork is the
liquidity, or ease of trade, associate with a specific artist’s market.
5.3 Liquidity
The effect of liquidity can be thought of in two ways in this analysis. The first being
scarcity, or the number of works by an artist offered at auction each year (a product of the size of
an artist’s body of work and how often those works trade hands), and two the number of
potential buyers who have the means to bid on an artwork. Although this analysis does not seem
to insinuate a meaningful relationship between the relative liquidity or illiquidity of an artist’s
and deviations between pre-sale estimates and outcomes, it is still an important consideration for
guarantors. For example, if a guarantor knows that a specific type of artwork rarely comes to
auction or that there are very few potential bidders at a certain price level, then that recognition
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will certainly impact the guarantor’s confidence in whether the artwork will achieve a minimum
price level at auction. Regardless of the impact of this specific characteristic, the analysis does
point to a number of opportunities for guarantors to more efficiently make guarantees.
5.4 Opportunities
5.4.1

Persistent alpha
As mentioned previously, there do seem to be artist markets where the favorable returns

and risk/reward profiles of guarantees made for those works are driven by factors other than the
general risk associated with art markets. In those cases, there may be an opportunity to gain
exposure to return streams that demonstrate persistent alpha, or a level of returns that cannot be
explained away by systematic, art market risk. In doing so, guarantors can improve the riskadjusted returns of the entirety of their guarantee activity.
5.4.2

Diversification
Pioneered by economist Harry Markowitz, modern portfolio theory (MPT) demonstrates

how risk-averse investors can construct portfolios of different assets to maximize expected
returns at a given level of risk (Investopedia). If we can identify artists whose guarantee return
profiles are sufficiently different from one another, then guarantors could reduce or potentially
eliminate the idiosyncratic risk, or risk due to the artist market’s unique characteristics, by
bundling those guarantees into a carefully constructed portfolio. Currently, the top two artists by
guaranteed value account for ~21% of guarantee market between 2016 and 2019. The Top 5
artists accounted for 35% of the total guarantee market over that same period (Art Tactic Auction
Guarantee Market Report – 2016 to 2019). This makes the case for bringing more artists into the
guarantee market, but the question is, which artists?
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As we saw in the previous section, guarantees made for works by Ultra-Contemporary
artists, on average, outperformed Contemporary and Postwar artists. In the case of Rashid
Johnson for example, the use of financial guarantees has been limited overall, with only seven
lots offered with guarantees between 2014 and 2020 (accounting for 5% of total value)
(ArtTactic Artist Market Report – Rashid Johnson, June 2020). In addition to younger artists,
female artists are still under-represented, and potentially under-valued within the guarantee
market as compared to their male counterparts. This does seem to be shifting however as female
artists have seen relatively greater increases in guarantee levels than male artists between 2018
and 2019. Four of the ten artists with the greatest percent increases in guaranteed levels during
that period were female versus one of the ten artists with the largest percent declines in guarantee
levels – number eight on the former list being Dana Schutz.
Lastly, artists of color are even less represented within the guarantee market. One artist
(Jean-Michel Basquiat) of the top twenty five artists by guarantee value in 2019 were artists of
color. This also seems likely to shift in the coming years as the value for works by artists of color
continues to increase within the art market. Julie Mehretu, for example, was listed number three
of the top ten artists in 2019 by guarantee value who did not have any guaranteed works in 2016,
2017 and 2018 (Art Tactic Auction Guarantee Market Report – 2016 to 2019). I expect some of
these trends to continue as the guarantee market evolves over time. Whether or not that evolution
will lead to greater absolute levels of guarantees is yet to be seen and will certainly be driven by
broader macro-economic impacts.
5.5 Broader Macro Economic Impacts
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The broader macro-economic conditions surrounding key factors such as inflation,
interest rates, and the stock market have always had a significant impact on health of the
guarantee market and will continue to have an impact as they change over time. Were the
persistently low levels of inflation we have experienced in the U.S. begin to rise, then hard assets
such as art may become more attractive as stores of value relative to more traditional assets such
as treasuries and bonds causing an increased demand for third-party irrevocable bids. Similarly,
the historically low levels of interest rates around the globe may continue to push investors
towards investments like guarantees with greater return prospects. This certainly seems to be the
case as we continue to see the number of potential third-party irrevocable bidders entering the
guarantee market rise. Additionally, the resilience of the current bull market being experienced
in U.S. stock markets will provide third-party guarantors with additional capital to spend on
guarantees for art. Finally, it would be wrong not to briefly discuss the potential impact that the
COVID-19 pandemic is having and may continue to have on guarantee markets.
5.6 COVID-19
Art market prices have proven surprisingly resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic as
collectors who are stuck at home with more time on their hands and greater disposable income in
their pockets have decided to focus on buying art. A high-proportion of guarantees for top value
lots has aided in maintain those prices (Gerlis, 2020). From the supply side, consignors may find
the certainty that guarantees provide a great incentive during times of such uncertainty.
However, the consignors desire to protect the sale of their artwork has been counterbalanced by
the auction houses’ need to minimize their downside risk or pass that risk along to a third-party
(Burns, 2020). Those collectors in a position to buy art may find their need as a third-party
guarantor to be an opportunity for their art collecting activities.
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6

Drawbacks and Shortcomings to the Analysis
There are a number of important considerations to address that will provide the necessary

context for a complete discussion of this analysis. The first two being the number and types of
datasets I have included as well as how far back their empirical datasets go.
6.1 Choice of Artists and Size of Artist Sample
As mentioned earlier, I attempted to set forth an objective methodology by which I
selected artists and auction records for inclusion in the analysis. Nevertheless, there was still an
undoubtably subjective aspect to that process in both setting that methodology and ultimately
choosing which artists to include. This is exemplified by how one of our pre-requisites for
inclusion in the sample set – a minimum level of auction sales turnover – lends a bias towards
artists who tend to be the most relevant in the market at the time of the analysis, and thus makes
the analysis more susceptible to potentially exaggerated results when incorporating those artists’
auction outcomes. Additionally, my ultimate choice of artists to focus on was influenced by my
desire to assemble a sample of artists that is hopefully representative of the demographics that
make up the contemporary art landscape today. Further, the number of artists that I was able to
accumulate auction records for was limited by time constraints. This creates a challenge for us to
try and avoid drawing generalized conclusions from a limited sample set of artists. This latter
constraint also influence how far back I was able gather empirical data.
6.2 Timeline of Empirical Evidence
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Due to the sheer amount of time it would have required, I was unable to accumulate
auction records going back greater further than 2010 for the artists with auction market track
records going back at least that far. Inclusion of data going back more than ten years may have
had a significant impact on our findings especially if we had included data from 2008 and 2009
when, as a result of the global financial crisis, the art market experienced a dramatic correction
and with it the performance of guarantees relative to expectations. In addition, for artists without
track records greater than ten years, the auction data I gathered was limited to the earliest
available. However, although those data sets may have been limited, they were intentionally
included for the purpose of gaining insight into the risk/reward profile of guarantees for artist’s
with limited track records and thus varying price expectations. That being said, the population of
auction records for those artist markets were still large enough to draw statistically significant
conclusions from. In order to make those conclusions, we also relied heavily on statistical
measures of that empirical data which can have a drawback in of itself.
6.3 Unique Nature of Artwork
An important factor to consider when making inferences from the guarantee model used
in this analysis is that the model inherently ascribes a degree of commodity status to the artworks
when in reality artworks are unique in nature. Each artwork by the same artist has different
characteristics such as the year it was made, the style it was made in, the provenance of its
ownership and its exhibition history in galleries and museums. All of these factors are integral to
the valuation of the work by art market participants and leads to different levels of relative desire
for the artist’s work. Because of their unique nature, it is very difficult to make broad
assumptions for a specific artwork’s hypothetical guarantee at auction based on the totality of
that artist’s market. Just like a painting is unique from all others, so too is the auction sale itself.
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6.4 Discreet Auction Event
When viewing a live auction, it becomes very clear that the auction of each artwork in the
end comes down to two people, the winning bidder and the underbidder. As a result, each and
every auction is a discrete event that is determined by the bidders involved from the time the
auctioneer begins taking bids to the hammer falling. The final price that the hammer comes down
at is thus completely dependent upon each bidder’s willingness to pay for the artwork at hand.
And that willingness to pay is further dependent upon numerous factors. As a result, we must
concede that the final price achieved by a work at auction cannot by solely determined by
expectations and empirical evidence, and thus guarantee pricing cannot be solely determined by
expectations and empirical evidence. Furthermore, the conclusions that I have sought to explore
and draw in this analysis are a few among countless other potential outcomes. In an attempt to
simplify the analysis, I have standardized and associated auction outcomes while all but ignoring
their isolated and detached nature from one another.
6.5 Bespoke Guarantee Negotiations
As mentioned throughout this paper, there are a number of assumptions made such as
guarantee levels, risk-neutral pricing and claims to upside cashflow by both the auction house
and third-party. These assumptions were applied to each hypothetical guarantee modeled using
the options based approach. In doing so, the guarantee process has been standardized to a much
greater extent than it would be in practice. Because the parties and artworks involved are rarely if
ever the same for any two guarantees made in real life, the negotiations of those guarantees are
highly bespoke. The inclusion of real people into the equation creates a level of negotiation and
game theory that is not captured by the model used in this paper. Those negotiations may have a
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varying degree of impact on the final agreements for those guarantees but will nonetheless shape
the ultimate agreement and its relative attractiveness to each party involved. This bespoke nature
of the guarantee structuring process makes standardizing those guarantees an oversimplification
of the process and difficult to extract wide reaching insights from. To that end, the hypothetical
nature of the analysis is just that, hypothetical.
6.6 Theory vs Real World Considerations
As a result of the theoretical nature of this paper, there are a number of important
similarities and differences to consider when comparing the auction houses’ current approach to
pricing guarantees and the methodology behind the pricing model laid out in this paper. The
most easily discernable similarity is the use of pricing levers such as the guarantee level itself,
the claim to upside cashflows and the use of fixed financing fees. One caveat to those levers is
the use of upfront payments made by the auction house to a third-party in exchange for taking on
the risk of the guarantee. Whereas the fixed financing fee is used consistently in the option-based
model as a significant form of risk-premium payment, the practice of making fixed payments to
the third-party irrevocable bidder in reality is not quite as common, nor are they made at as
significant a level in practice. Another similarity between the two approaches is the incorporation
of probabilistic assumptions into potential outcomes for a given guarantee. However, this
similarity diverges to some context. While the model deployed in this paper utilizes the
probabilities from the standpoint of empirical distributions and their deviation from auction
house estimates, auction houses are more likely to consider multiple scenarios where the
probability of each scenario occurring is based on their confidence around certain prices being
achieved.

60

While I cannot claim to know the full extent to which auction houses inject empirical
data and quantitative analysis into their pricing of auction house guarantees and irrevocable bids,
I can say with confidence that they for better or worse do not rely on the use of quantitative
inputs as heavily as the model used in this paper. On the contrary, auction houses must
necessarily lean on contextual information when negotiating premiums with a consignor.
Information such as the exact number of potential bidders for a work of art, or further the number
of potential third-party bidders, is of tantamount importance to ensuring that they avoid the
single greatest risk associated with guaranteeing a work of art – not being able to sell the work
and instead having to potentially acquire the work themselves. This risk not only reduces the
profitability of the auction sale but also increases opportunity costs by tying up that capital which
could be used towards other business needs or additional guarantees, an opportunity cost that
cannot be fully expressed by the analysis.
In addition to having a heightened level of insight into the potential market of buyers
there are for a given work of art, the auction houses also have a heightened level of responsibility
to maintaining and strengthening relationships with loyal clients. It is easy to put a fair price on a
hypothetical guarantee when the consignor or third-party is theoretical and nameless, but it is a
completely different matter when that client has done a substantial amount of business with the
auction house over many years.
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7. Conclusion
Although the drawbacks and shortcomings mentioned previously may make our analysis
unrepresentative of the real world, I do not think they outweigh the benefit of providing art
market participants one more tool by which they can analyze guarantee opportunities – hopefully
bringing additional transparency to the process. As the use of guarantees by auction houses and
third-party irrevocable bidders has evolved over the years, their negotiations have become more
and more complex. This complexity has added to their perceived opacity and the increased
financialization of the art market. Whether or not auction guarantees are in-deed here to stay, I
believe that the use of additional quantitative tools such as the ones discussed in this paper can
help address those changes and prove to be a beneficial tool for those involved in the guarantee
process.
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